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Advanced technologies and automation are important facilitators of single pilot operations, but they also contribute 
to the workload management challenges faced by the pilot. We examined task completion, workload management, 
and automation use in an entry level jet (ELJ) flown by single pilots. Thirteen certificated Cessna Citation Mustang 
(C510-S) pilots flew an instrument flight rules (IFR) experimental flight in a Cessna Citation Mustang simulator. At 
one point participants had to descend to meet a crossing restriction prior to a waypoint and prepare for an instrument 
approach into an un-towered field while facilitating communication from a lost pilot who was flying too low for 
ATC to hear.  Four participants experienced some sort of difficulty with regard to meeting the crossing restriction 
and almost half (n=6) had problems associated with the instrument approach.  Additional errors were also observed 
including eight participants landing at the airport with an incorrect altimeter setting.   
 
Introduction 
 
The advent of personal jets such as entry level jets 
(ELJs) and very light jets (VLJs) has made a wider 
range of operations and missions available to private 
and professional pilots alike.  Private pilots can now 
fly higher and faster than ever before and commercial 
ventures, such as air taxi operations and short charter 
flights, are now more economical.  The automation 
and advanced technology aboard these aircraft are 
essential features that make flight by single pilots 
possible. 
 
However, automation and advanced technology bring 
their own challenges.  The design of glass cockpit 
systems currently used in these aircraft places a 
heavy cognitive load on the pilot in terms of long-
term, working, and prospective memory; workload 
and concurrent task management; and developing 
correct mental models as to their functioning (e.g., 
Burian & Dismukes, 2007). These cognitive demands 
have been found to have a direct relationship to pilot 
errors committed during flight (Dismukes, Berman, 
& Loukopoulos, 2007).  Burian (2007) found a 
significant correlation between poor workload and 
time management (i.e., poor crew and single-pilot 
resource management, which are abbreviated CRM 
and SRM, respectively) and problems using advanced 
avionics. Additionally, almost two-thirds of the 
accident reports she analyzed involved at least one of 
six different cognitive performance problems (e.g., 
distraction, memory problems, risk perception).  She 
found that these problems were experienced at 
similar rates by pilots flying professionally and those 
flying for personal reasons. Workload management is 
a crucial aspect of SRM. Best practices for single-
pilot flight task and workload management must be 
better understood within the current operating 
environment and beyond as we move to an era of 
optimizing the national airspace system outlined in 
NextGen concepts (FAA, 2012).   
 
In an exploratory simulation study we examined 
private and professional pilot proficiency in single 
pilot task and workload management using a level 5 
flight training device (for simplification, a 
“simulator”).  Participant task performance of one of 
the scripted high workload periods occurring during 
the cruise portion of an IFR flight, described below, 
is reviewed here.  A detailed description of the entire 
study can be found in Burian, et al. 2012. 
   
Method 
 
Thirteen certificated Cessna Citation Mustang (C510-
S) pilots flew an experimental flight, composed of 
two legs with realistic tasks in the US northeast 
corridor, in a Cessna Citation Mustang simulator.  
Performance was evaluated against airline transport 
pilot and instrument rating practical test standard 
criteria (FAA, 2008, 2010) as well as the successful 
completion of the scripted tasks.   
 
Participants 
Six of the 13 participants flew the Mustang as 
professional pilots and the other seven flew it for 
personal business or recreation (i.e., owner-
operators).  They were recruited through letters sent 
to the 321 airmen who possessed C510-S type ratings 
and lived in the contiguous 48 states of the USA at 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20130013794 2019-08-29T15:43:25+00:00Z
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the time we conducted the study.  Participants were 
paid a rate of $50 per hour and were reimbursed all 
travel costs. 
 
Measures and Apparatus 
Prior to flying the scripted flights in the simulator, 
participants completed three questionnaires 
pertaining to: demographics, opinions about 
advanced avionics and automation, and Citation 
Mustang and G1000 cockpit set-up preferences.  
Prior to flying each leg of the experimental flight, 
participants were provided with standard flight bag 
materials and a printed flight briefing packet 
including: a description of the flight, proposed time 
of departure, aircraft location at the departure airport 
and planned aircraft parking at the destination airport, 
a departure airport diagram, a completed flight plan 
on FAA Form 7233-1, a completed navigation log 
and weight and balance information including a 
weight and balance diagram, a complete weather 
briefing package, paper IFR en route navigation 
charts, complete Jeppesen Airway manuals with 
current paper departure, arrival, and approach plates, 
and airport and facilities directories.   
 
The flight simulator, located at the FAA Civil 
Aerospace Medical Institute facilities in Oklahoma 
City, OK, featured a realistic Mustang flight deck 
with a G1000 avionics suite, digital control loaders, 
and a high fidelity digital surround sound system that 
accurately replicated flight, engine, system, and 
environmental sounds.  The out-the-window display 
system included a 3D Perception 225 degree (lateral 
angle) spherical floor to ceiling projection screen that 
gave the pilot a realistic field-of-view.  The G1000 
default settings were adjusted to those preferred by 
each participant, as indicated through their 
questionnaires, prior to the start of data collection 
each day. 
 
Eye movements of participants were tracked using a 
FaceLab™ v5 system consisting of non-invasive 
cameras, IR emitters, and software from Seeing 
Machines, Inc.  During the experimental flights 
participants were asked to make instantaneous self-
assessment (ISA) ratings of their workload using a 
small rectangular box with five numbered buttons (1 
= very low workload; 5 = very high workload) when 
a red light at the top of the box was illuminated.  
Researchers controlled when the light would 
illuminate remotely from the experimenter’s station.  
Once illuminated, the light stayed on for 60 seconds 
or until the participant pressed one of the numbered 
buttons.  Participants were given a printed card 
explaining the meaning of each ISA rating for their 
reference in the simulator.  Immediately following 
the completion of each leg of the experimental flight 
participants completed a paper-pencil version of the 
NASA Task Load Index (TLX) giving subjective 
workload ratings on each of the TLX subscales for 
the flight overall, as well as for specific scripted high 
workload tasks or phases of flight.  Following the 
completion of the experimental flights, audiotaped 
debriefing interviews were held with the participants. 
 
Procedure 
Following a review of the overall study purpose and 
completion of informed consent paperwork, 
participants were given flight briefing materials to 
review for a familiarization flight to be held the 
following day.   
 
The simulation study began the next day with 
introductions, calibration of the eye tracker, the 
completion of a take-off and landing at KOKC.  
Participants then completed the familiarization flight, 
lasting approximately 30 minutes, from Clinton 
Sherman Airport (KCSM) to Will Rogers World 
Airport in Oklahoma City (KOKC). Participants 
practiced completing ISA ratings during the 
familiarization flight.  After a brief break with 
beverages and snacks provided, participants were 
then given briefing materials for the two legs of the 
experimental flight and given as much time as they 
desired to review them and prepare for the first leg. 
 
With the assistance of recently retired air traffic 
controller subject matter experts (ATC SMEs), who 
had experience managing traffic in the US northeast 
corridor, participants completed the first leg of the 
scripted experimental flight (Teterboro, NJ [KTEB] 
to Martin State Airport in Baltimore, MD [KMTN]), 
lasting approximately one hour.  They then 
completed the NASA TLX for that leg.  Following a 
break for lunch participants were given as much time 
as they desired to review pre-flight briefing materials 
for the second leg of the experimental flight (KMTN 
to Ingles-Hot Springs, VA [KHSP]), also lasting 
approximately one hour.  At the completion of this 
flight, participants again completed NASA TLX 
measures, debriefing interviews were conducted, and 
participants were thanked for their participation. 
 
Results 
 
Demographics 
In the year prior to the study, our 13 male participants 
reported flying the Cessna Mustang a mean of 153.7 
hours (range: 68-350 hours) and as a single pilot in 
the Mustang for a mean of 138.5 hours (range: 15-
350 hours). No significant differences in flight hours, 
experience, or self-reported skill with advanced 
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avionics and automation were found between owner-
operators and professional pilots. Additionally, unlike 
other studies (e.g., Tsang & Shaner, 1998) we found 
no significant difference in task success as a function 
of age, which ranged from 29 to 61 years (M = 48.9 
years). 
 
High Workload Task Performance 
One of the high workload periods analyzed in this 
study occurred approximately three-quarters of the 
way through the second leg of the experimental flight 
(KMTN to KHSP).  Participants were flying at an 
interim cruise altitude of 16,000 ft (from an original 
cruise altitude at FL200) and had two major flying 
tasks to complete: descend at their discretion to meet 
a crossing restriction of 10,000 ft. 15 nm prior to a 
waypoint (Montebello VOR [MOL]), and prepare for 
an ILS runway 25 approach into KHSP, an un-
towered airport.  Additionally, during this period, 
participants could hear center controllers 
unsuccessfully trying to communicate with another 
pilot (played by one of the researchers) who was 
trapped under the cloud deck.  ATC SMEs asked the 
participants to relay communication from the “lost 
pilot” to them and although participants could have 
declined, all 13 agreed. 
 
This high workload period lasted an average of 7 
minutes and 55 seconds (SD = 31 seconds, range = 
0:07:11 to 0:08:53) and ended when ATC handed the 
participant pilots off to another controller at the end 
of the lost pilot scenario, which generally occurred 
around the time participants crossed MOL, less than 
35 nm from KHSP.  Although participant completion 
of the approach and landing at KHSP was not part of 
this defined high workload period, approach and 
landing briefing and preparation were expected to 
have occurred during this time.  Therefore aspects of 
participant approach and landing performance 
associated with the quality of their briefing and 
preparation will be discussed. 
 
Overall Flight Performance.  Although at least one 
error was committed by each of the participants 
during this high workload period or during the 
approach into KHSP, generally they flew the aircraft 
within appropriate parameters.  For example, all 
participants maintained engine temperatures below 
the limit of 830o and responded to all radio calls from 
ATC.  Twelve pilots met the crossing restriction, and 
no excessive bank or pitch angles, or excessive yaw 
were observed.  All participants flew close to Vmo 
(250 KIAS) during this period and their airspeeds 
ranged from 193 KIAS (M = 210.85 KIAS, SD = 
14.51 KIAS) to 248 KIAS (M = 243.23 KIAS, SD = 
4.36 KIAS) with an overall average airspeed of 
228.30 KIAS (SD = 8.80 KIAS).  Those flying 
slower airspeeds tended to be participants who 
reduced their speeds purposefully near the end of the 
lost pilot scenario apparently to increase the amount 
of time they had available to finish preparing for the 
approach at KHSP. 
 
The observable errors committed during this high 
workload period or the approach and/or landing at 
KHSP can be seen in Table 1.   
___________________________________________ 
Table	  1	  	  
Participant	  Errors1	  Committed	  	  
___________________________________________ 
	   All	  
Participants	  
(n	  =	  13)	  
Owner-­‐
Operators	  
(n	  =	  7)	  
Professional	  
Pilots	  
(n	  =	  6)	  
	  
Communication/	  
readback	  error2	   4	   1	   3	  
	  
Did	  not	  report	  
leaving	  16,000	  
ft.	  MSL3	   10	   6	   4	  
	  
Minor	  crossing	  
restriction	  pro-­‐
gramming	  error	   1	   1	   0	  
	  
Major	  crossing	  
restriction	  pro-­‐
gramming	  error	   4	   2	   2	  
	  
Failed	  to	  make	  
crossing	  
restriction	   1	   0	   1	  
	  
Misunderstood	  
lost	  pilot/ATC	  
communication	  
capabilities4	   5	   4	   1	  
	  
Minor	  ILS	  pro-­‐
gramming	  error	   1	   0	   1	  
	  
Major	  ILS	  pro-­‐
gramming	  error	   7	   4	   3	  
	  
Landed	  at	  KHSP	  
with	  incorrect	  
altimeter	  setting	   8	   3	   5	  
	  
	  	  	  Total	  errors	   41	   21	   20	  
	  
Mean	  number	  
of	  errors	   3.15	   3.00	   3.33	  
________________________________________ 
1 “Errors” includes only those that were observable 
2 Communication or readback errors committed by four 
participants 
3 A professional pilot did report late while descending through 
15,000 ft MSL 
4 Participants had difficulty understanding or remembering that the 
“lost pilot” could hear ATC but that ATC could not hear the lost 
pilot. 
________________________________________ 
One professional pilot committed only one error 
when he neglected to report the initiation of his 
descent from 16,000 ft to ATC; all other participants 
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made two or more errors during this high workload 
period.  A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant 
differences between owner-operators and 
professional pilots with regard to the number of 
errors committed, F(1,11) = 0.54, p =.48.  However, 
two surprising findings were the large number of 
pilots who neglected to contact ATC to report they 
had initiated their descent from 16,000 ft MSL (n = 
10) and the large number who landed at KHSP with 
an incorrect altimeter setting (n = 8).   
 
Crossing Restriction 15nm before MOL.  Participants 
received the clearance to descend (at their discretion) 
with a crossing restriction when they were 44 nm 
from MOL.  They began their descents when they 
were an average of 32.96 nm (SD = 4.44 nm) from 
MOL (about 18 nm from the crossing restriction 
point) and were traveling an average of 224.69 KIAS 
(SD = 10.21 KIAS).   
 
In addition to flying a descent manually, there are 
two primary ways to accomplish a descent using the 
G1000 automation: vertical speed (VS) mode and 
vertical path (VPTH).  As its name implies, VS is an 
autoflight mode and is set by choosing a rate of 
descent in feet per minute.  In contrast, VPTH is 
actually programmed in the G1000 and allows the 
pilot to indicate crossing restrictions which the 
automation will then ensure the aircraft meets during 
the programmed descent. 
 
Twelve of the thirteen participants programmed 
VPTH to accomplish this task although two of them 
did not couple VPTH to the AP and just used its 
guidance to support their descent using VS (one of 
them did not make the crossing restriction—was 
1,180 ft high).  Additionally, VPTH did not capture 
for one participant because he forgot to change the 
target altitude in the altitude reference window on the 
PFD so he ended up using VS instead.  The 
remaining participant used VS with no VPTH 
guidance as a back-up.   
 
It took the 12 participants an average of 53 seconds 
(SD = 42 seconds; range = 00:20 to 02:09) to 
program the VPTH descent although there were two 
distinct clusters of time it took to do this 
programming.  These clusters appeared unrelated to 
participant subgroup (owner-operator or professional 
pilot) or whether the VPTH was used for the descent 
or only for back-up information.  The participants 
with the lowest programming times (n = 8, range = 
20 to 38 seconds) took an average of 29 seconds (SD 
= 7 seconds) to do so; those with the longest 
programming times (n = 4, range = 01:35 to 02:09) 
took an average of 1 minute 58 seconds (SD = 10 
seconds) to complete the programming.  As expected, 
those taking more time to complete the programming 
interleaved other tasks while doing so. 
 
One participant who unsuccessfully used VS with 
VPTH guidance chose an initial descent rate of 2500 
fpm and continued to fly close to Vmo, the maximum 
operating speed for the aircraft.  When it became 
apparent that he might not make the crossing 
restriction, he compensated by pulling back some 
power but waited almost a minute before increasing 
his descent rate to 3000 fpm (passing through 12,700 
ft MSL, 2.58 nm from the crossing restriction point).  
Although it seemed clear that he knew he had not met 
the crossing restriction, he did not contact ATC to 
inform them.  Two pilots, including the one who was 
unsuccessful, initially made an error when 
programming VPTH by placing the point where the 
crossing restriction was to be met 15 nm past MOL 
instead of 15 nm before MOL.  Both caught their 
errors fairly quickly and corrected them. 
 
To summarize, four of the thirteen pilots had 
difficulty programming the crossing restriction or 
descending but only one actually failed to make the 
crossing restriction.   
 
Communication Assistance for the Lost Pilot. While 
descending to meet the crossing restriction and 
preparing for their approach into KHSP, pilots 
assisted with transmitting communication from a lost 
VFR pilot to ATC.  Due to problems with the 
simulator audio system, one participant was not 
presented with the lost pilot scenario during leg 2.  
As mentioned earlier, all the other participants agreed 
to assist and six volunteered before ATC could even 
ask.  Of the pilots presented with the “lost pilot 
scenario,” all continued to offer assistance until the 
situation had been resolved with the exception of one 
who did not transmit the final two comms from the 
lost pilot to ATC because he was engaged in 
preparation for his approach into KHSP.   Five 
participants had at least some initial confusion as to 
who could hear whom during the scenario; in those 
cases the lost pilot clarified that she could hear ATC 
and only one participant continued to transmit ATC 
comms to the lost pilot, in addition to lost pilot 
comms to ATC, throughout the scenario. 
 
Approach and Landing at KHSP.  The lost pilot 
situation was typically resolved about the time that 
participants crossed MOL which is 17.3 nm from the 
initial approach fix (IAF) for the approach into 
KHSP.  Some participants appeared to become a bit 
concerned about being ready for the impending 
approach into KHSP during the lost pilot scenario 
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and five did such things as slow down or ask for 
vectors or some other alternate routing that would 
give them added time to prepare (e.g., stay on current 
heading a bit longer past MOL, requested a different 
approach fix which was 5 miles further away from 
MOL, etc.).  Contrary to what was expected, most 
pilots did not actively engage in preparing for the 
approach during the lost pilot scenario.  Three 
queried ATC about aspects of the approach while 
assisting with the lost pilot comms (e.g., which 
approach could be expected) and one was observed 
looking at aircraft weights on the MFD, however 
very little of their preparation for the approach 
occurred during the lost pilot scenario.  The other 
nine participants were not engaged in any observable 
approach preparation during the scenario.   
 
Further analysis revealed that six pilots (three owner-
operators and three professional pilots), including 
two who queried ATC during the scenario, had 
actually completed most or all of their approach 
preparations (e.g., reviewing/briefing the approach) 
before this period or the lost pilot scenario began and 
six participants could be observed entering in 
required frequencies into the radios quite early during 
the leg (e.g., on climb out from KMTN).   
 
Four participants briefed the approach (i.e., reviewed 
the approach plate for the first time) between MOL 
and the IAF and one professional pilot briefed the 
approach very late, just before arriving at the 
intermediate fix.  An owner-operator was never 
observed briefing the approach by reviewing the 
approach plate prior to conducting the approach, 
though he did scroll down to the decision height 
(DH) information at the bottom of the Jeppesen chart 
displayed on the MFD when he was 252 ft above DH. 
 
Interestingly, of the six participants who briefed the 
approach before the start of this high workload 
period, two actually programmed the approach at that 
time; the other four participants waited until after 
passing MOL when the specific approach in use was 
confirmed by ATC.  During the post flight 
debriefings, the two who programmed the approach 
quite early spoke of their preference to get 
programming finished as soon as possible, even if it 
meant having to change it later.  Both completed the 
approach without difficulty. 
 
Eleven participants programmed the approach after 
the end of the lost pilot scenario.  The more 
significant difficulties encountered typically involved 
incorrectly programming the G1000, e.g., not 
activating or arming the approach, or being in the 
wrong autopilot mode to capture the approach. 
 
There was a fairly even split between those who did 
(n = 7) and did not (n = 6) encounter difficulty in 
programming or executing the approach. Not 
surprisingly, those who briefed the approach quite 
early in the leg (n = 4, 66%) tended to have fewer 
difficulties programming or executing the approach 
than participants who completed most of their 
briefing activities just before conducting the 
approach (n = 2, 33%).  Similarly, participants who 
programmed the approach quite early (n = 2) had no 
problems conducting the approach whereas only 4 of 
the remaining 11 (36%) participants, who 
programmed the approach just before or even after 
they had begun executing it, had no problems. 
 
Interestingly, six of the nine participants who 
reported to ATC that they had gotten the automated 
weather report at KHSP, landed at KHSP with an 
incorrect altimeter setting (29.86 instead of 29.84) as 
did two others who did not check the weather prior to 
landing (see Table 1).  The incorrect altimeter setting 
these eight participants landed with was the altimeter 
setting which was given to them when they 
descended through the transition altitude of 18,000 ft 
MSL much earlier in the flight, before this high 
workload period began. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
In this study of single pilot workload in ELJs we 
found no significant differences in performance, 
errors made, or success rates in accomplishing the 
major tasks analyzed due to pilot type (owner-
operator or professional pilot).  It is possible that the 
owner-operators in our study were more experienced 
than most or that those with less experience or skill 
did not volunteer to participate.  It is also possible 
that our professional pilots fly less frequently or are 
less capable than non-participants but we have no 
evidence or reason to believe that this was so.  
 
Workload management when piloting technologically 
advanced aircraft involves the allocation of mental 
resources to accomplish multiple tasks concurrently. 
Most participants completed short tasks, such as 
dialing in a new altitude, before moving on to other 
tasks.  Some participants also demonstrated a 
similarly focused method when programming the 
G1000.  Almost all performed other tasks 
concurrently such as dialing in a new heading while 
listening to the rest of an ATC clearance.  As would 
be expected, most participants chose to interleave 
more lengthy automation programming with other 
cockpit tasks. Contrary to what one might expect 
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though, those who programmed the G1000 without 
interruption, e.g., for the approach at KHSP or to 
meet the crossing restriction, made just as many 
programming errors as those who interleaved other 
tasks while programming. 
 
Participants utilized a variety of techniques to deal 
with high workload.  Some chose to slow the aircraft 
down to “buy” time or shed or truncated a task, such 
as acknowledging an ATC traffic alert but then not 
personally scanning for the traffic.  These two 
strategies tended to be used less often than others 
such as requesting vectors or alternate routing from 
ATC.  In future studies it would be informative to 
evaluate the use of strategies for management of high 
workload that are controlled by the pilot (e.g., 
slowing the aircraft, shedding tasks) as compared to 
those involving assistance from the outside (i.e., 
ATC).  Both are certainly necessary and appropriate 
in various situations and we found that those who 
utilized methods under their own control, such as by 
reducing airspeed, often accomplished the scripted 
tasks successfully.   
 
Almost all participants were proactive in reducing 
later workload by taking care of some tasks as early 
in the flight as possible.  This longstanding principle 
of completing as many tasks as possible during low 
workload periods to reduce the number that must be 
performed during periods of higher workload 
generally worked well for our participants, 
particularly the two who programmed the approach at 
KHSP very early.  It would be interesting to examine 
in a future study the efficacy of this strategy for 
programming instrument approaches even if it means 
that changes are required later. 
 
Task prioritization relative to the amount of time 
available is a critical part of workload management.  
Those participants who had not adequately briefed 
and prepared for the instrument approach at KHSP 
prior to the end of the lost pilot scenario were more 
likely to encounter difficulty in accomplishing the 
task successfully.  Single pilots operating jets under 
NextGen must have a keen sense of the temporal 
aspects of flying tasks and use a variety of strategies 
to manage their workload to complete their flights 
successfully. 
 
Single-pilot workload management is strongly 
associated with automation use and errors made when 
programming the automation.  We found that when 
participants were confronted with high workload they 
tended to opt for a lower level of automation to 
reduce their workload in the moment (i.e., using 
autoflight modes as opposed to programming the 
G1000), even though that meant their overall ongoing 
workload might be greater.  A mix of both input 
errors and more concerning errors indicating a lack of 
understanding of how the automation and autoflight 
modes worked were observed.  Input error 
identification strategies developed for airline crews 
could be adapted for use by single-pilots flying 
VLJs/ELJs (Berman, Dismukes, & Jobe 2012).  
Targeted activities are needed during training to tease 
out pilot misperceptions and misunderstandings about 
how advanced automation functions. 
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